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PREJUDICB:-

SuFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVIT-Defendants were indicted in a federal district court
for conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States and to
advocate overthrowing the government by force or· violence ~ violation of a
federal statute. 1 During argument on their motion for a 90-day extension, the
judge remarked he thought "public policy might require that the matter be given
prompt attention ..• when per~aps there may be some more of these fellows up
to thatsort of thing"; that "I am not going to give them anything like 90 days, I
am going to tell you right now"; and, in answer to defense counsel's contention
that the indictment failed to allege any acts of force or violence, '·No they want to
wait until they get everything set and then the acts will come." Defendants filed
timely affidavits of personal bias and prejudice pursuant to section 144 of the new
Judicial Code,2 setting out the above facts as grounds for disqualification of the
judge. The district judge refused to disqualify himself and defendants petitioned
the United Stat~ Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus requiring him to do
so. Held, petitions dismissed. Taken in their context the remarks of the judge did
not lend fair support to the charge that he had a personal bias or prejudice against
petitioners; the affidavit was therefore legally insufficient. Foster v. Medina, (App.
2d, 1948) 170 F. (2d) 632.

1 P.I:.. 772 (62 Stat. L. -) c, 115, p. 142 (1948); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1948
Revision).
·
2 P.L. 773 (62 Stat. L. -) c. 6, p. 33 (1948); 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948).

1949]

RECENT DECISIONS

847

Disqualification of federal district judges because of personal bias and prejudice
originated in 1911 with enactment of section 21 of the old Judicial Code.3 Section
144 of the new code contains the same substantive provisions; failure of Congress
to change the law in any material respect when it revised the Judicial Code indicates legislative approval of the strict construction which the courts placed on the
old section. A leading decision is Berger v. United States,4 relied on in the principal case, where strong remarks of a judge condemning the German-American
element in this country during the First World War were held sufficient to disqualify him from hearing the trial of a German-American charged with espionage.
The rule was laid down that the affidavit must state "facts and reasons, substantial
in character and which, if true, fairly establish a mental attitude of the judge
against the affiant which may prevent impartiality of judgment.••. "5 Numerous
later decisions in the lower federal courts have adopted an interpretation much
more strict than the language of the Berger decision would seem to require, but the
Supreme Court has consistently declined to review them. 6 It has been held that
previous adverse rulings by the judge in the same case or in similar cases do not
tend to show a personal prejudice.7 An allegation of judicial bias and prejudgment
of the merits of the case has been held insufficient.8 Most important, the facts
contained in the affidavit must show a personal prejudice directed specifically
against the affiant. 9 The motive behind these strict rules is the desire of the courts
to prevent litigants from using the statute as a means to harass and delay jusice.10
Tested by the foregoing rules it seems clear that the decision of Judge Medina
a 36 Stat. L. 1090 (1911); 28 U.S.C. § 25 (1927).
255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230 (1921).
5 Jd. at 23.
6 See for example Chafin v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 592, cert. den.,
269 U.S. 552, 46 S.Ct. 18 (1925); Morse v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 4th, 1932) 54 F. (2d) 1027,
cert. den., 286 U.S. 557, 52 S.Ct. 640 (1932); Ryan v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1938)
99 F. (2d) 864, cert. den., 306 U.S. 635 (1939), rehearing den., 306 U.S. 668 (1939). This
strict attitude is reflected in holdings that technical requirements of the statute as to time of
filing the affidavit and the accompanying certificate of good faith signed by counsel of record
must be followed to the letter. See United States v. 16,000 Acres of Land, (D.C. Kan. 1942)
49 F. Supp. 645; Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., (D.C. Ala. 1912) 194 F. 978; Saunders v.
Piggly-Wiggly Corp., (D.C. Tenn. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 581.
7 United States v. 16,000 Acres of Land, supra, note 6; United States v. Fricke, (D.C.
N.Y. 1919) 261 F. 541; Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Tatham, (C.C.A. 9th, 1930)
40 F. (2d) 894.
s Henry v. Speer, (C.C.A. 5th, 1913) 201 F. 869, 120 C.C.A. 207; Craven v. United
States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 605, cert. den., 276 U.S. 627, 48 S.Ct. 321 (1928);
In re Beecher, (D.C. Wash. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 530.
o Henry v. Speer, supra, note 8; Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., supra, note 6; Hurd v.
Letts, (App. D.C. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 121, 80 App. D.C. 233; Ryan v. United States, supra,
note 6; United States v. Buck, (D.C. Mo. 1938) 23 F. Supp 508, appeal dismissed, 102 F.
(2d) 976 (1938).
lU This consistently maintained attitude toward the disqualification procedure was early
expressed in Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 33 S.Ct. 1007 (1913). See
especially Henry v. Speer, supra, note 8, and Benedict v. Seiberling, (D.C. Ohio 1926) 17 F.
(2d) 831.
4
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and the court of appeals is amply supported by authority. While the report of
the principal case contains only small portions of the affidavits, there is nothing
to show that the judge had a personal prejudice or bias against the petitioners within the meaning of section 144. His remarks certainly indicate a strong dislike for
those who conspire to overthrow the government by force, but they are too general and ambiguous to warrant the conclusion that he was speaking of the petitioners personally or that his mind was already convinced as to their guilt. The
decision seems to recognize that a judge's prejudice against a class will not necessarily prevent his giving justice to a member of that class.11
John C. Walker

11 In his dissent in the Berger case, Justice McReynolds pointed out this distinction between personal and class prejudice. While the cases seldom specifically mention the distinction, it is doubtless present m the minds of the judges. It has even been said that the absence
of the word "personal" in the affidavit will be fatal. Henry v. Speer, supra, note 8.

